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This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on the performance of Indian 
commercial banks. Using a balanced panel data set covering from the beginning of the 
deregulation period (1992) to the most recent years (2004) and employing a DEA-based 
Malmquist index of total factor productivity change, this paper attempts to quantify the 
magnitude of total factor productivity change and identify its main sources. We also explore 
whether deregulation has had a different impact on the performance of public, private and 
foreign banks and whether it affected the risk-taking behaviour of market participants. The 
empirical results seem to indicate that, after an initial adjustment phase, the Indian banking 
industry experienced sustained productivity growth, driven mainly by technological progress. 
Banks’ ownership structure seems to have an impact on bank efficiency but does not appear to 
have an influence on total factor productivity change. Although ownership per se does not 
seem to matter as much as increased competition, during the deregulation process foreign 
banks appear to have acted as technological innovators, thereby increasing even further the 
competitive pressure in the Indian banking market. Finally,  our results also indicate an 
increase in risk-taking behaviour along with the whole deregulation process.     
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 1. Introduction 
A large number of economies, both in developed and developing countries have deregulated 
their banking systems over the past two decades. The primary objective of such reforms is to 
improve productivity, efficiency and profitability of the banking systems and also to increase 
international competitiveness. Financial deregulation in India began in 1992, following the 
Indian economic crisis of 1991, and it is an integral element of the ongoing process of 
economic and structural reform. The Indian banking sector is of particular interest for a 
number of reasons. First of all, the pragmatic and gradual philosophy of the Indian 
deregulation policy offers great scope for analysing the relationship between the extent of 
regulatory constraints and the efficiency and productivity of economic agents. Secondly, the 
diverse ownership of the Indian banking system provides an opportunity for a test of 
performance differentials between public, private and foreign banks in reaction to a changing 
regulatory environment. Thirdly, Indian banking is a considerable component of Asian 
financial markets and it shares quite similar characteristics with the banking system of other 
Asian countries. Since most Asian countries have embarked on a deregulation path or are 
contemplating to do so, an empirical investigation of the effects of deregulation on efficiency 
and the dynamics of productivity change in the Indian case could provide useful policy 
suggestions to those countries.   
Despite a vast literature on the effects of deregulation on the efficiency and productivity of 
banks, the majority of studies refer to the US banking experience – such studies generally 
found little cost productivity change but improved profit productivity (see Berger and Mester, 
2003; Mukherjee et al., 2001 among others). As far as studies outside the US are concerned, 
results are mixed: deregulation seems to have had a positive effect in some countries but not 
in others. Controversy is not only related to the effects of deregulation on efficiency and 
productivity change, but also to the sources of productivity growth and to the effect of 
 2deregulation on different kinds of ownership and on the risk-taking behaviour of banks.   
This study attempts to examine the effect of deregulation on the performance of the Indian 
banking industry in general and on different ownership structures in particular. We seek to 
quantify productivity change and also identify its sources. In addition, we investigate banks’ 
risk taking behaviour during the deregulation process. This study contributes to the existing 
efficiency and productivity literature in several ways. Firstly, we use a time period which 
encompasses the whole deregulation process. This enables us to perform a comprehensive 
analysis of the processes of adjustment and adaptation of the Indian banking system to a new 
regulatory structure. Secondly, we use a broad dynamic indicator, the total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth index, as the measure of performance. TFP growth is a widely used indicator 
for the role of technology on productivity, yet there is little evidence on TFP growth in 
banking and on how deregulation affects it (Tirtiroglu et al., 1998). In this study we calculate 
TFP growth using a DEA-based Malmquist index, and further decompose it into technological 
change, technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change. Both the extent and the 
sources of productivity change are relevant in examining the effects of deregulation and have 
important policy implications. We also analyse the role of ownership on technology 
innovation during the deregulation process. Furthermore, we improve the existing literature 
by adding a new dimension to the specification of input-output variables, based on the 
risk-taking characteristics of banking activities. Specifically, we control for loan quality by 
including the book value of performing loans (the difference between total loans and 
non-performing loans) instead of the book value of total loans. Finally we attempt an analysis 
of the time pattern of risk-taking behaviour for the entire industry following deregulation. We 
do this by comparing the TFP growth index derived from our model, which controls for the 
quality of loans, with a model which does not control for bad loans. The idea is, the bigger the 
gap between the models the more risk banks are taking, and vice versa.   
 3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Indian 
banking system. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the effect of deregulation on the 
performance of banks in terms of efficiency and productivity in general and on the Indian 
banking system in particular. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework and the analytical 
techniques. Section 5 describes data and variables used in this study. Section 6 contains the 
empirical results and Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Overview of the Indian commercial banking sector 
Contributing to the policy of social control of banks, the Indian banking system was 
characterised by dominant government ownership
1 and stringent regulation of entry, branch 
licensing, administrated structure of interest rates, direct credit allocation as well as high 
mandatory reserve ratio prior to deregulation.  Reform in the Indian commercial banking 
was initiated in 1992 with the intention to facilitate a healthy and productive financial system 
to support the sustainable growth of the real economy. The reform package was guided by the 
recommendation of two Narasimhan Committee reports (in 1991 and 1998 respectively). The 
deregulation process can therefore be divided in two stages: the first stage refers to the period 
1992-1997; the second started in 1998 and is still being implemented.   
Two important features characterize the reform policy in the Indian commercial banking. First, 
the deregulation follows a gradual approach and proceeds in a step by step manner. Such 
gradualism approach is mainly attributable to the moderate macroeconomic condition and 
immature institutional setting prior to deregulation as well as Indian political economy. It 
would be helpful in terms of keeping stability of macroeconomic condition, leaving time to 
put strong institutional setting into place and develop a political consensus in making the 
reform process more politically sustainable (Toye, 2001). Second, the deregulation process is 
coexistence with re-regulation. This feature become further salient from the switch of policy 
 4focus from curative measures during the period of 1992-1997, which emphasize the 
enhancement of market orientation and competition
2, to the preventive measures
3 1998 
onwards, which accentuate smooth function of the banking sector in the long run 
(Narasimham, 1998)
4.  Statistical description on the market structure and operational 
behaviour of Indian schedule commercial banking (excluding regional rural banks) over the 
past thirteen years indicates the response of those banks in reaction to the changing regulatory 
environment. 
As shown in Table 1, concentration ratios are decreasing over time. The five-bank 
concentration ratio (by total assets) is well below the average level of European banking 
documented in the literature (Casu and Girardone, 2005). The net interest margin between the 
implicit lending rate
5 and the implicit deposit rate
6 decreased from 13.4% in 1992 to 3.2% in 
2004, a sign of the increased competition introduced by deregulation. A closer look at the data 
further reveals the narrowing of the net interest margin resulting both from the decrease of the 
implicit lending rate and the increase of the implicit deposit rate, which suggests that 
commercial banks faced competitive pressures both from the liability and the asset side. 
Furthermore, the data indicate a pervasive preference for credit substitutes and imply growing 
risk-aversion on the part of banks. The expected credit expansion following the reduction of 
the cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) did not take place. By contrast, the 
data show a decreasing credit to deposit ratio on one hand, and an increasing investment to 
total assets ratio on the other. The investment in government securities, as a percentage of 
total earning assets, for the commercial banking system increased from 26.13% in 1991 to 
32.4% in 2004, which is well beyond the requirement of SLR of 25% (since 1997 onward). 
The cautious attitude of banks towards extending new credit accompanied by a preference for 
safer more liquid investment, especially government bonds can be explained as the voluntary 
choice of banks in view of high stock of non-performing assets (NPAs) inherited from the 
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nationalisation. Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Indian Commercial Banking, 1992-2004 
 
                            1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of Banks 77                          76 74 86 92 100 103 105 101 100 97 92 90
Concentration Ratio (%)
(1) Deposit based 
1  bank  concentration  ratio                              22.9 22.1 21.9 21.1 21.4 20.9 20.6 22.5 22.8 23.0 22.5 21.8 20.2 
5  banks  concentration  ratio                              49.3 47.5 46.8 45.5 45.6 44.8 44.4 45.4 45.4 44.2 43.4 42.5 40.5 
10  banks  concentration  ratio                              67.3 65.6 64.1 63.1 63 61.4 60.3 61 60.9 59.6 59.1 58.7 57.0 
(2) Asset based 
1  bank  concentration  ratio                              27.8 26.1 25.6 23.7 23.7 22.9 22.4 23.2 23.5 24.4 22.6 22.0 20.6 
5  banks  concentration  ratio                              51.6 49.3 49.0 46.5 44.9 44.1 44 43.9 43.4 46.7 43.3 42.6 41.5 
10  banks  concentration  ratio                            67.8 66.1 65.1 64.8 59.6 58.3 57.9 57.4 57.2 63.1 59.0 58.2 56.7 
Operational Structure (%)
(1)  Credit  deposit  ratio  60.0                            58.9 55.5 61.6 58.2 55.1 53.5 51.7 53.6 53.1 53.4 78.6 49.9 
(2)  Investment  as  percentage  of  total  assets                              28.9 30.5 35.4 33.6 31.0 33.3 34.2 35.7 37.3 38.0 38.2 40.8 40.6 
(3) Investment in government security as 
percentage to total earning assets  26.1                            29.1 29.5 34.1 32.6 33.9 34.4 33.8 33.4 33.2 28.1 31.6 32.4 
Interest Margin of the Traditional Business (%)
(1)  Implicit  interest  rate  on  advance  19.2                            14.8 13.7 10.5 12.5 13.7 13.7 13.3 12.0 12.0 9.2 9.3 8.1 
(2)  Implicit  interest  rate  on  deposit                                  5.8 7.2 6.4 5.4 7.1 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.0 6.2 6.7 6.1 4.9
(3)  Spread=(1)-(2)  13.4                                7.6 7.3 5.1 5.4 6.3 5.9 5.4 4.0 5.8 2.5 3.2 3.2
Diversification of Income Channel (%)
(1) Fee-based income as percentage of total 
income  11.8                            10.7 13.3 13.5 13.7 12.8 14.1 12.7 13.8 13.0 15.9 18.3 21.6 
(2) Investment income as percentage of 
interest income  25.6                            31.6 37.4 42.3 37.1 36.0 40.6 41.7 44.3 43.9 45.2 44.3 45.7 
Profitability (%)
(1) Cost income share  82.2  90.7  87.7                        84.1 84.3 83.9 83.0 86.0 84.0 85.0 80.2 76.4 71.3 
(2) ROA  0.4  -1.1  -0.8                            0.4 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.1
Total Loans (TLs)  158516                    171801 168532 223654 267104 292392 343243 393005 464320 551424 615431 701296 808571 
Non-performing Loans (NPLs)  5675                        7959 8808 5908 9248 22504 23636 28314 29686 31730 37885 34770 27018
The Annual Growth Rate of TLs (%)    -----    8.4                        -1.9 32.7 19.4 9.5 17.4 14.5 18.1 18.8 11.6 14 15.3
The Annual Growth Rate of NPLs (%)  -----                            40.2 10.7 -32.9 56.5 143.3 5 19.8 4.8 6.9 19.4 -8.2 -22.3
Note: figures for TLs and NPLs are measured by Rs. in Crores and refer to banks related to this study. While all others refer to the scheduled commercial banking (exclude 
regional rural banks). Source: Sayuri (2002), Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, various i 8
period
7, increasing risk exposure introduced by various deregulation measures, as well as increasing risk 
consciousness along with more stringent prudential norms and information disclosure requirements in the new 
regulatory environment. Finally, banks attempted to keep profitable by diversifying their earning sources. The 
share of fee-based income over total income increased from 11.8% in 1992 to 21.6% in 2004. Meanwhile, the 
earning from investment as a ratio of total interest income also increased from 25.6% in 1992 to 45.7% in 2004.   
 
3. Literature review   
The banking industry has historically been more heavily regulated than other industries. Starting from the1980s, 
a large number of economies, both in developed and developing countries, carried out extensive liberalisation 
of their banking and financial sectors, with the primary goal of improving efficiency through the creation of a 
more competitive operational environment. However, the conventional wisdom is not always validated by 
empirical studies (Berger and Humprey, 1997). 
The majority of studies on the effects of deregulation on the efficiency and productivity of banks have analysed 
the US banking sector. These studies generally found little or negative cost productivity change (Berger and 
Humphrey， 1992； Bauer et al., 1993; Humphrey, 1993; Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and Mester, 2003), but 
positive profit productivity change or technical productivity improvement (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Berger 
and Mester, 1997; Alam, 2001; Mukherjee et al., 2001; Berger and Mester, 2003). As far as studies outside the 
US are concerned, the results of deregulation were sometimes found to be favourable to productivity growth, as 
in Norway (Berg et al., 1992), Australia (Avkiran, 2000; Sturm and Williams, 2004), Turkey (Isik and Hassan, 
2003), Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998), and Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998). Examples of mixed or 
unfavourable results of deregulation were found in Portugal (Mendes and Rebelo, 1999; Canhoto and Dermine, 
2003) and in Spain (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996; Lozano-Vivas, 1998; Kumbhakar et al., 2001). Controversy 
is not only about whether deregulation stimulates efficiency improvement and productivity growth, but also 
about the sources of productivity growth. While some studies attribute productivity growth to technological 
progress (Alam, 2001; Mukherjee et al., 2001; Berger and Mester, 1997; Avkiran, 2000; Canhoto and Dermine, 
2003; Kumbhakar et al., 2001; Sturm and Williams, 2004) others are in favour of efficiency improvements  9
(Berg et al., 1992; Gilbert and Wilson, 1998; Isik and Hassan, 2003).   
It is generally found that deregulation has a different impact on different ownership structures. While Sturm and 
Williams (2004) reported similar TFP change for foreign and domestic banks in Australia during the 
post-deregulation period (1988-2001), Isik and Hassan (2003) indicate that in Turkey private, and especially 
foreign banks benefited the most from the more liberal and competitive environment, in terms of efficiency 
improvement, than state-owned banks. A more impressive increase of TFP growth of foreign as opposed to 
domestic banks was also found by Leightner and Lovell (1998) in their study of Thai banks over the 1989-1994 
period. 
While deregulation is expected to improve efficiency and productivity, there are concerns about the adverse 
effect it might have on the risk-taking behaviour of market participants. However, the connection between 
productivity, deregulation and risk-taking has not been systematically investigated in the literature. A few 
studies did warn that deregulation has the potential to deteriorate banks’ risk position by providing market 
participants with more opportunities to invest in risky projects (Flannery, 1998; Mishkin, 1999) and/or by 
reducing the charter value of banks resulting from the increased competition (Keeley, 1990; Grossman, 1992; 
Hellmann et al., 2000). By contrast, there is also evidence suggesting that a banking crisis is more likely to 
happen in a country with stricter regulatory restrictions (Barth et al., 2001; 2004) and that the incentive of 
market participants to act prudently to protect their charter value dominates the motivation to take risky 
opportunities in a lax regulatory environment (Gonzalez, 2005). The policy implication is that if deregulation 
induces more risk taking, it could harm the process of economic growth in the medium and long run. As a 
consequence governments need to carefully design the entire deregulation process and put a strong institutional 
setting in place to curb the possible negative effect of deregulation on the stability of the banking system, while 
reaping its positive effects on efficiency and productivity improvement (Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache, 
1999). 
Coming to studies specifically related to the Indian banking system, the empirical evidence on the effects of 
deregulation to date has been surprisingly sparse; a summary review of studies on the efficiency and 
productivity of the system is provided in Table 2.   
Overall, efficiency and productivity studies about the Indian commercial banking sector suffer from a number  10
of drawbacks: the relatively short time period observed, the limited sample size used, and the static nature of 
the analytical method employed. As mentioned in the introduction, our study aims to improve the current 
literature by extending the sample period to cover the whole period of regulatory reforms (1992-2004) and by 




Following the work of Debreu (1951), Koopmans (1951), Shephard (1953, 1970) and Farrell (1957) the 
efficiency of a firm can be defined and measured as the radial distance of its actual performance from a frontier. 
In a production function context, this frontier is defined as the maximum feasible level of outputs given the inputs 
levels, or alternatively as the minimum feasible level of inputs given the outputs levels; a firm’s inefficiency will 
respectively be measured as the radial inputs contraction or radial outputs expansion necessary to reach the 
frontier.  
In a dynamic perspective, outwards or inwards movements of the frontier over time represent technological 
change, whereas movements of firms closer to or further away from the frontier represent efficiency change. 
The net effect of technological and efficiency change is the overall productivity change.   
There is a very large and well-established literature on the measurement of efficiency frontiers which can be 
divided in two main streams: parametric techniques, such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and non 
parametric techniques, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
8. For reasons of space, in what follows we 
will focus only on the methodology chosen for this paper: the non-parametric DEA approach, which we use to 
measure inefficiency with an inputs-minimisation orientation, and the calculation of Malmquist indices to 
measure efficiency and productivity changes and their components.   
 
The choice of a non-parametric approach is based on several considerations. Firstly, when using panel data 
parametric approaches often use a time trend, which smoothes the variation of productivity changes over time. 
By contrast, non-parametric approaches allow for substantial variations embedded in data to be revealed (Alam, 
2001). Given that the magnitude and the way by which deregulation affects efficiency and productivity may  11
change across the years, a non-parametric approach is more appealing. Secondly, DEA works well with a small 
sample size and most of all it does not require any assumption about the functional form of the frontier or of the12
Table 2: Efficiency and Productivity Studies: the Indian Commercial Banking (1990-2004). 





















income, spread and 
total income 
1992-1995  25  Overall 
technical 
efficiency 
DEA  Public banks improved their efficiency 




Labor and physical capital 
as inputs with the sum of 
reserve and equity as the 
quasi-fixed input 
Deposits, loans and 
investments and 
branches 
1985-1992  50  TFP change  Translog shadow 
cost function 
Deregulation did not materially enhance 
TFP of banks, especially for public banks.   
Sathye (2003)  (Model A): interest 
expenses and non-interest 
expenses 
(Model B): deposits and 
the number of employees 
(Model A): net 
interest income and 
non-interest income 
(Model B): total 
loans and 
non-interest income 
1997-1998  94  Overall 
technical 
efficiency 
DEA  Public and foreign banks had better 
efficiency scores than private banks. 
Foreign banks dominated the constitution 
of frontier. 
Ataullah et al. 
(2004) 
Operating expenses and 
interest expenses 
(Loan-based 
model): total loans 






1988-1998  n.a  Overall 
technical 
efficiency 
DEA  The overall technical efficiency increased 
gradually over time especially after 1995. 
Low scale efficiency is the main source of 
the overall technical inefficiency. Private 
banks and foreign banks were more 
impressive in increasing their efficiency. 
Banks were more efficient in generating 
earning assets than generating income due 
to the presence of non-performing loans. 
Mohan and 
Ray (2004) 











No significant difference in terms of TFP 






Total deposits and 
operating expenses 
Total loans and 
other earning assets 
1995-2002  40  TFP change  DEA-type 
Malmquist TFP 
index 
No significant growth in TFP for the 
overall industry. Public banks were 
different from private banks in terms of 
TFP growth and sources of TFP growth.   
Note: the study of Ataullah et al. (2004) is a cross-country research of Indian and Pakistan banking, while others are single country study of India
 inefficiency component. The choice of an input orientation is based on the fact that by 
conventional wisdom regulation comes as a cost imposed on market participants; we would 
therefore expect changes in inputs use to be closely associated with the changes in incentives 
and constraints introduced by regulatory reform.   
Coming to the methodology used, DEA is a mathematical linear programming technique 
developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) (CCR) which identifies the efficient 
frontier from the linear combination of those units/observations that (in a production space) 
use comparatively less inputs to produce comparatively more outputs. In particular, if N firms 
use a vector   of inputs to produce a vector   of outputs, the input-oriented 
CCR measure of efficiency of a particular firm is calculated as: 
K R x + ∈








































                                                       
 (1) 
 
where i θ 1 ≤   is the scalar efficiency score for the i-th unit. If  i θ =1 the i-th firm is efficient as 
it lies on the frontier, whereas if  i θ < 1 the firm is inefficient and needs a (1- i θ ) reduction in 
the inputs levels to reach the frontier. 
The CCR model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), which is the optimal scale in the 
long run. The additional convexity constraint ∑ =1 i λ  can be included in (1) to allow for 
variable returns to scale (VRS) (see Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) or BCC model). The 
BCC model therefore measures pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency, calculated as 
the difference between the CCR score and the BCC score. The BCC model is used in this paper since several factors such as imperfect competition, regulatory requirements and 
managerial breakdown may cause a unit not to be operating at the optimal scale. 
 
The Malmquist index (Malmquist, 1953) is a summary measure of the change in TFP of a 
given unit over time. This overall measure can be split into the product of three different 
components: the change in technical efficiency (measuring whether the unit has moved closer 
to the frontier), the change in scale efficiency (measuring whether the unit has moved closer 
to the constant returns to scale facet of the frontier) and the shift of the frontier itself 
(measuring whether the unit has improved its production possibilities). The index is calculated 
as ratios of distance functions from the frontier which is reciprocal to DEA input-oriented 
measure of technical efficiency score in equation (1). Each unit is identified by its 
inputs-outputs bundle x,y with a superscript indicating whether it is observed at time t or t+1. 
The distance is defined as D
t or D
t+1 depending on whether the reference frontier is that of 
time t or t+1. More in detail, the index for the ith unit is computed as 
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= EFFCH * TECH      
                      
The term outside the brackets represents the change in technical efficiency (EFFCH), and it 
will be >1 if over time the unit has moved closer to the frontier. The part inside the brackets 
represents technical progress (TECH), and is calculated as the geometric average of the distance 
between the two frontiers; again, a value >1 indicates technological improvement. The overall 
 14index of TFP is given by the product of the two components, so that index bigger than 1 
indicates that total factor productivity has increased, and viceversa for a value smaller than 1. 
If variable returns to scale are assumed, the part outside the brackets (EFFCH) can be further 
decomposed into two parts: one is pure technical efficiency change (PEFCH), which isolates 
the technical efficiency catching-up of units against the VRS technology frontier; the other is 
scale efficiency change (SECH) which captures the movements towards or further away from 
the constant return facet of the frontier. The interpretation of scores >1 or <1 is the same as 
before. This further decomposition is represented by equation (3), where the subscripts c and 
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=PEFCH*SECH                                          ( 3 )  
 
Finally, following Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), we construct a cumulative TFP index using 
the equation below: 
                                               ( 4 )   
•
− + = ) 1 ( 1 t t t TFP TFP TFP
where  is the growth rate of TFP between t-1 and t
•
t TFP
9. Since the Malmquist index presents 




 155. Variables selection and data set 
The first step in measuring efficiency and productivity is to specify the inputs and outputs of 
the units under analysis. Broadly following the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977), in this paper we also control for loan quality by including the book value of 
performing loans (the difference between total loans and non-performing loans) instead of the 
book value of total loans. This choice is motivated by the heterogeneity in the quality of loans 
among individual banks and the typical concern about the trade-off between efficiency and 
stability in a deregulated environment. Loans are the main output of banks; ignoring 
differences in their quality would result in the underestimation of efficiency for those banks 
with less non-performing loans and would disguise the underlying instability of the industry 
as a whole. Moreover, performing loans can also be considered as a proxy for the quality of 
risk management activities. The diversification of income shown in Table 1 reflects the shift 
of business focus of Indian commercial banks from credit extension to other fee-based 
business during our sample period. We include fee-based income as an output to 
accommodate this tendency. Finally we specify other earning assets, along with performing 
loans and fee-based income, as the third output.   
On the input side, total operating cost is used as a single input to aggregate monetary 
expenditure associated with loanable funding, fixed assets, and labour. This kind of treatment 
is mainly due to the well-known dimensionality problem associated with DEA and our limited 
sample size: a high number of variables relative to the number of observations causes more 
units to be wrongly identified as efficient because too many constraints have been specified 
and observations tend to become incomparable against each other
10. This in turn leaves little 
room for further improvement, so that empirically technical efficiency changes appear to 
make no contribution to productivity growth. Furthermore the estimated frontier is unstable, 
which gives confusing results about technology change (Thirtle et al, 2003). To test for 
 16robustness, we also used two alternative inputs specifications: one used the monetary stock of 
loanable funding, the monetary stock of fixed assets and the number of employees; the other 
used interest payment, other operating costs and personnel costs. These models identified 
10%-15% of the observations as super-efficient
11 and had average technical efficiency scores 
higher than 90%, indicating a possible dimensionality problem.   
To investigate the risk-taking behaviour of market participants we specify a second model 
(Model II) that uses total loans instead of performing loans (along with the other outputs). 
This second model is used exclusively for the analysis of risk-taking behaviour; all other 
results reported in the paper refer to the first model (Model I).   
 
Table 3: Specification of Model I and Model II 
 
  Model I  Model II 
Input   Total Operating costs  Total Operating costs 
Performing Loans  Total Loans 
Other Earning Assets  Other Earning Assets 
Outputs 
Fee-based Income  Fee-based Income 
 
As regards the data set, this study considers scheduled commercial banks operating 
continuously throughout the period 1992-2004. Focusing on the behaviour of continuously 
operating banks is all the more important given the substantial changes in the environment in 
which they operated during our study period. Banking data from 1992 to 2001 are obtained 
from annual account data of scheduled commercial banks of the Reserve Bank of India and 
data from 2002 to 2004 are drawn from the India Bank’s Association Bulletin. For 
homogeneity reasons we excluded regional rural banks due to their regional business focus, 
which is different from the nation wide operation of other scheduled commercial banks. The 
data were analysed for inconsistencies and outliers. If banks merged during the period of 
observation, we chose to aggregate their balance sheets and treat them as a single composite 
bank for the entire period (this procedure has been followed, among others, by 
 17Carbo-Valverde et al., 2004). Moreover, one foreign bank (Sonali bank) was identified as an 
outlier across all of our specifications of input-output factors and was therefore removed from 
the data set. Consequently, our balanced panel data set consists of yearly observations
12 for 27 
public sector banks, 20 domestic private banks and 18 foreign banks between 1992 and 2004, 
65 for each year and 845 in total. In the estimations that follow, also the time series has been 
divided in two sub-periods (1992-1997 and 1998-2004) that refer to the first and second stage 
of deregulation. 
 
6. Empirical results. 
The empirical work has been conducted in two stages: first we look at the static results 
obtained by estimating yearly DEA frontiers, which allow for cross sectional comparisons, 
then we calculate the Malmquist indexes of TFP, to look at the changes over time. For the 
analysis we have divided the cross section in three ownership groups (public, domestic private 
and foreign banks) and the sample period in the two sub-periods The yearly DEA results are 
reported in Table 4, which details the average overall technical efficiency, pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency scores for the whole industry as well as for the three 
ownerships and the two sub periods.   
The average overall efficiency score for the whole industry over the whole sample period is 
78%, indicating a 22% average potential reduction in inputs utilisation. The results for the two 
sub periods reveal that the degree of input waste significantly
13 decreased in the second stage 
of deregulation (20%) compared to the first stage (26%). The highest average overall 
efficiency score over the whole period is enjoyed by foreign banks (81%), followed by public 
(78%) and private banks (75%); however, only the difference between foreign and private 
banks is statistically significant. A closer look at the results shows that the rank between 
foreign and public banks reversed in the two sub periods, while private banks are consistently 
 18rated as the least efficient. Specifically, in 1992-1997 foreign banks are significantly more 
efficient than public banks (at a 10% level), with an average overall efficiency score of 82% 
compared to a 71% of public banks, whereas the ranks are reversed in 1998-2004 (with a 5% 
level of significance), with scores respectively of 80% and 84%. This change in ranking 
between public and foreign banks across the two sub periods explains why their efficiency 
over the entire sample period (81% and 78% respectively) is not significantly different. We 
attribute this change in ranking to the variation of historical backgrounds and to the different 
speed of response to the changing regulatory environment.  This finding is consistent with 
the hypothesis that ownership makes a more pronounced difference at the initial stages of   
deregulation (Sayuri, 2002). In our case, foreign banks seem to reap the benefits quicker than 
domestic banks. This can be due to their relatively stronger historical operating background 
prior to deregulation, which helps them to overcome the initial shock introduced by 
deregulation at a faster speed than domestic banks, and allows them to take advantage more 
quickly of the new productive opportunities offered by deregulation.   
As regards the components of overall inefficiency, low levels of pure technical efficiency 
contribute more than scale effects, with scores respectively of 85% and 92%. Public banks 
have more serious scale inefficiency problems (their overall scale efficiency score is 89%, 
compared to 93% of foreign banks and 94% of private banks) which points to the fact that 
they are over-staffed and over-branched. The results are confirmed in Table 5, which reports 
the details on the scale of operation of different ownerships. Whereas foreign and private 
banks display increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale, public banks are 







 Table 4: Overall Technical Efficiency, Pure technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency for the Industry and by Ownerships, 1992-2004 
 
Overall Technical Efficiency  Pure Technical Efficiency  Scale Efficiency  Ownership 
type/year  foreign    private public              total foreign    private Public total foreign  private public  total
1992   0.75   0.70   0.65   0.70   0.78   0.73   0.84   0.79   0.96   0.96   0.79   0.89  
1993   0.86   0.69   0.65   0.72   0.90   0.72   0.82   0.81   0.96   0.96   0.81   0.90  
1994   0.76   0.54   0.49   0.58   0.82   0.60   0.77   0.73   0.92   0.92   0.66   0.81  
1995   0.85   0.72   0.74   0.76   0.89   0.80   0.88   0.86   0.96   0.90   0.84   0.89  
1996   0.88   0.84   0.87   0.87   0.89   0.87   0.90   0.89   0.98   0.97   0.98   0.98  
1997   0.82   0.78   0.83   0.81   0.86   0.81   0.90   0.86   0.95   0.96   0.93   0.95  
1998   0.79   0.79   0.87   0.82   0.85   0.82   0.92   0.87   0.93   0.96   0.94   0.94  
1999   0.79   0.75   0.85   0.80   0.85   0.80   0.91   0.86   0.93   0.94   0.94   0.94  
2000   0.78   0.71   0.79   0.76   0.86   0.77   0.89   0.85   0.91   0.93   0.90   0.91  
2001   0.84   0.78   0.80   0.80   0.90   0.83   0.90   0.88   0.92   0.94   0.90   0.92  
2002   0.79   0.85   0.87   0.84   0.85   0.89   0.89   0.88   0.91   0.96   0.97   0.95  
2003   0.82   0.85   0.88   0.85   0.89   0.90   0.90   0.90   0.92   0.95   0.97   0.95  
2004   0.76   0.71   0.79   0.76   0.89   0.78   0.88   0.85   0.85   0.92   0.90   0.89  
Mean:1992-1997  0.82   0.71   0.71   0.74   0.86   0.76   0.85   0.82   0.96   0.95   0.84   0.90  
Mean:1998-2004  0.80   0.78   0.84   0.80   0.87   0.83   0.90   0.87   0.91   0.94   0.93   0.93  
Mean:1992-2004  0.81   0.75   0.78   0.78   0.86   0.79   0.88   0.85   0.93   0.94   0.89   0.92  
Statistical Test on the Difference in Overall Technical Efficiency across ownerships   
Foreign vs Public  Foreign vs Private  Public vs Private   
t-test  Mann-Whiteney U test  t-test  Mann-Whiteney U test  t-test  Mann-Whiteney U test 
1992-1997        1.89** -1.60**  2.30∗ -2.08∗  0.10 -0.16 
1998-2004  -2.17∗        -2.03∗  0.76 -0.713 2.17∗ 2.13∗ 
1992-2004            0.92 -0.077 2.30∗ -2.10∗  0.72 -1.359
Note: **，*, significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively.Table 5: Return to Scale of Banks, by Ownerships 
 
Foreign Banks  Private Banks  Public Banks  Items/year 
I C D I C D I C D 
1992  50.0   22.2   27.8   40  5  55  0   0   100  
1993  44.4   33.3   22.2   45  10  45  0   0   100  
1994  33.3   11.1   55.6   45  10  45  0   0   100  
1995  33.3   27.8   38.9   30  0  70  0   3.7   96.3  
1996  50.0   27.8   22.2   75  10  15  11.1   11.1   77.8  
1997  55.6   22.2   22.2   55  5  40  0   7.4   92.6  
1998  50.0   27.8   22.2   65  10  25  0  3.7   96.3  
1999  44.4   38.9   16.7   80  5  15  0   3.7   96.3  
2000  61.1   16.7   22.2   80  0  20  11.1   3.7   85.2  
2001  44.4   27.8   27.8   60  10  30  0  0   100  
2002  61.1   5.6   33.3   35  5  60  0   0  100  
2003  61.1   22.2   16.7   65  20  15  0   22.2   77.8  
2004  44.4   22.2   33.3   40  10  50  0  0   100  
Note: I refers to increasing returns to scale, C refers to constant returns to scale, D refers to decreasing returns to 
scale. Figures are measured by the share (%) of each return to scale characteristic to the total number of banks 
(Public banks: 27; Private banks: 20; Foreign banks: 18). 
 
Bearing in mind that a low score only signals the existence and not the cause of scale 
inefficiency, we interpret this result as a signal of the difficulty of public banks to absorb the 
over-employment and over-branching they inherited from the nationalisation period. 
Coming to the analysis of TFP change, Table 6 illustrates the year-by-year Malmquist index 
















 Table 6: TFP Growth and Its components, 1992-2004 
 
  Foreign Banks 
Year EFFCH TECHCH  PECH  SECH  TFPCH 
1993 1.199  0.9  1.199  1  1.079 
1994 0.874  1.553 0.913  0.958  1.358 
1995 1.134  0.763 1.079  1.05  0.865 
1996 1.031  0.784 1.009  1.022  0.809 
1997 0.936  1.039 0.967  0.969  0.973 
1998 0.947  1.024 0.975  0.971  0.969 
1999 0.991  0.963 0.986  1.005  0.955 
2000 1.005  1.124 1.035  0.971  1.13 
2001 1.078  1.019 1.063  1.014  1.098 
2002 0.927  1.14  0.936  0.99  1.057 
2003 1.054  1.013 1.048  1.006  1.068 
2004 0.921  1.514 1  0.921  1.394 
Mean:1992-1997 1.028  0.972  1.029  0.999  0.999 
Mean:1998-2004 0.987  1.102  1.005  0.982  1.088 
Mean:1992-2004 1.004  1.046  1.015  0.989  1.05 
  Private Banks 
Year EFFCH TECHCH  PECH  SECH  TFPCH 
1993 0.99  0.962 0.986  1.004  0.953 
1994 0.769  1.463 0.813  0.946  1.126 
1995 1.344  0.774 1.369  0.982  1.041 
1996 1.178  0.742 1.089  1.082  0.874 
1997 0.927  1.058 0.933  0.994  0.981 
1998 1.009  0.993 1.015  0.994  1.002 
1999 0.948  1.036 0.962  0.986  0.983 
2000 0.942  1.173 0.963  0.978  1.105 
2001 1.103  0.947 1.082  1.02  1.045 
2002 1.097  1.123 1.08  1.016  1.233 
2003 1  1.069 1.007  0.993  1.068 
2004 0.825  1.365 0.863  0.956  1.127 
Mean:1992-1997 1.023  0.969  1.022  1.001  0.991 
Mean:1998-2004 0.985  1.094  0.993  0.992  1.078 
Mean:1992-2004 1.001  1.04  1.005  0.995  1.041 
  Public Banks 
Year EFFCH TECHCH  PECH  SECH  TFPCH 
1993 0.999  0.951 0.977  1.022  0.95 
1994 0.745  1.583 0.931  0.8  1.179 
1995 1.52  0.689 1.17  1.299  1.047 
1996 1.193  0.753 1.021  1.169  0.899 
1997 0.92  1.097 0.994  0.926  1.01 
1998 1.073  1.027 1.032  1.04  1.102 
1999 0.973  1.036 0.984  0.99  1.009 
 232000 0.932  1.12  0.978  0.953  1.044 
2001 1.016  0.992 1.008  1.007  1.008 
2002 1.078  1.142 0.998  1.08  1.231 
2003 1.01  1.082 1.008  1.002  1.093 
2004 0.902  1.313 0.974  0.926  1.185 
Mean:1992-1997 1.044  0.97  1.016  1.028  1.012 
Mean:1998-2004 0.996  1.098  0.997  0.999  1.093 
Mean:1992-2004 1.016  1.042  1.005  1.011  1.059 
  Total Banks 
Year EFFCH TECHCH  PECH  SECH  TFPCH 
1993 1.048  0.94  1.037  1.011  0.985 
1994 0.786  1.537 0.888  0.885  1.209 
1995 1.349  0.734 1.201  1.124  0.991 
1996 1.142  0.758 1.038  1.1  0.865 
1997 0.927  1.069 0.967  0.958  0.991 
1998 1.017  1.015 1.011  1.006  1.033 
1999 0.97  1.016 0.977  0.993  0.986 
2000 0.955  1.137 0.989  0.966  1.086 
2001 1.059  0.985 1.046  1.013  1.044 
2002 1.04  1.136 1.005  1.035  1.181 
2003 1.019  1.059 1.018  1  1.078 
2004 0.883  1.382 0.945  0.934  1.22 
Mean:1992-1997 1.033  0.97  1.021  1.012  1.002 
Mean:1998-2004 0.99  1.098  0.998  0.992  1.087 
Mean:1992-2004 1.008  1.043  1.008  1  1.051 
Statistic Test for Difference in Annual Growth of TFP across Ownerships 







Public Banks  1.059  0.165  0.260      0.511  0.404 
Foreign Banks  1.051    0.186  0.029   
Private Banks  1.041       
Note: EFFCH refers to efficiency change, TECHCH refers to technology change, PECH refers to pure technical 
efficiency change, SECH refers to scale efficiency change and TFPCH refers to Malmquist TFP change index. 
EFFH= PECH *SECH; TFPCH=EFFCH *TECHCH. 
 
The industry registered an average annual TFP growth rate of 5.1 % over the entire sample 
period, which is almost entirely concentrated in the second stage of deregulation (8.7%, 
versus a 0.2% of the first stage). In particular a downward trend in TFP growth started in 1994, 
two years after the onset of deregulation, and continued until 1998, when it reversed to reach 
a peak in 2004. The majority of this TFP growth is due to technological progress (4.3% on 
average) whereas technical efficiency change is relatively flat. Consistently with the 
 24aforementioned pattern, technological progress also took place solely in 1998-2004, whereas 
its contribution to the improvement of TFP was negative in the first stage. This result may 
signal the impact on the productivity of banks of the prudential policies adopted in 1992-1997 
and reflects the adjustment process of market participants.     
The pattern of technological progress is confirmed also by Table 7, which shows how many 
banks are technological innovators
14: 12.5% of banks in the sample are innovators in 
1992-1997 compared to 33% in 1998-2004, which confirms that technical progress took place 
mainly in the second stage of deregulation and relates its sustainability to a larger group of 
innovators. Moreover, more than 50% of the innovators are foreign banks in both stages of 
deregulation, signalling the relevance of their contribution to the introduction of new 
technology. This finding delineates the particular role that foreign ownership plays during the 
deregulation process, with foreign banks acting as innovators in reaction to the intensive 
competitive pressure, in turn further increasing the intensity of competition in the whole 
system. Overall our results are consistent with the argument that increased local competition 
and contestability will increase the technological spillover effects of multinationals (Glass and 
Saggi, 1998). 
The time pattern of TFP growth and its components is revealed more clearly in Figure 1, 
which shows how the movement of TFP growth is closely mirrored by that of technological 
progress over the entire period of study, hinting at the important role that technological 
change played   
over the entire sample period. Figure 1 also shows the opposite direction of efficiency change 
and technological change. The more advanced technological level of 1998-2004 together with 
its significantly higher DEA efficiency score suggest that the overall technical efficiency 
change was stable over the sample period, even against the new higher frontier, signifying an 
attempt of average practices to catch up with the best.   
 25 
 
Table 7: The Technological Innovators by Ownership Type and by Year.     
 
Year  N. of innovators  Foreign banks  Private banks  Public banks 
1993 1  0 1  0 
1994 3  2 1  0 
1995 0  0 0  0 
1996 0  0 0  0 
1997 5  2 1  2 
1998 3  2 0  1 
1999 6  4 1  1 
2000 3  3 0  0 
2001 5  4 1  0 
2002 5  2 2  1 
2003 8  3 2  3 
2004 5  4 1  0 
1993-1997 8
a 4 2  2 
1998-2004 20
a 11 5 4 
 
a This number is less than the sum of the number of innovators as some banks acted   
as innovators more than once. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison among Efficiency Change, Technology Change and TFP Change for 









































Going back to Table 6, deregulation appears to have affected the improvement of TFP for all 
 26three ownerships. In terms of average annual growth rate, public, foreign and private banks 
registered a 5.9%, 5 % and 4.1% respectively. Although these values seem different at a first 
glance, overall no ownership type is found to be significantly more productive in terms of 
average annual TFP growth; these results are consistent with those reported by Mohan and 
Ray (2004). 
The year-by-year results illustrated in Figure 2 by ownership type suggest that all banks made 
the majority of their gain in TFP growth in the second stage of deregulation and shared the 
same pattern of improvement. This could explain why the average annual TFP growth is 
relatively uniform across the three ownerships over the entire sample period. The 
decomposition of TFP growth into its components further suggests that deregulation had a 
similar effect on all bank types, namely: a productivity growth driven by technological 
progress over the entire sample period; an inward shift of the frontier in 1992-1997 with a 
catching up of technical efficiency; an outward shift of the frontier and a decrease in technical 
efficiency in 1998-2004.   
 


































Coming finally to the changes in scale efficiency, these are more pronounced for public banks 
in the period 1992-1997, where they register an average improvement of 2.8% compared to 
the relative stability of private and foreign banks. After 1998 public banks remain 
substantially stable (the index is 0.999) whereas private and foreign banks record a worsening 
of their performance (respectively of a –0.8% and –1.8%). Since a substantial proportion of 
public banks remains characterised by decreasing returns to scale (see Table 5), the results 
overall signal little evidence of the success of the rationalisation of unviable branches and 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme
15 that public banks carried out. Still looking at Table 5, two 
thirds of foreign and private banks operate under increasing and constant returns to scale. We 
can therefore attribute their worsening in scale efficiency to the difficulty in taking advantage 
of economies of scale through simple production expansion due to the increasing complexity 
and sophistication of financial products.     
Overall, the comparison of the static DEA analysis with the dynamics of TFP growth and its 
components suggests that ownership may only matter in cross-sectional efficiency 
comparisons, which heavily depend on the historical background of individual ownerships; 
once the cross-ownership comparison was put in a dynamic setting characterised by a level 
playing field with operational freedom, ownership makes no difference in terms of both 
magnitude and the source of TFP change.   
To sum up the evidence presented so far, there appears to be a rebound of TFP growth and 
technological change between the first and the second stage of deregulation. For the overall 
banking industry, the recovery of the trend of TFP change and technological change happens 
in 1997 and in 1996 respectively. Looking at the separate ownerships, the time of recovery for 
TFP growth is 1996 for public sector banks and 1999 for foreign and domestic private banks. 
However, all banks uniformly get back on track for technological progress in 1996, which is 
 28the same time as the industry aggregate. Overall, the U shape time pattern of TFP growth and 
technological change suggests that it takes time for market participants to adapt to a new 
regulatory environment.   
As mentioned in the introduction, there is wide concern that deregulation might increase 
volatility in financial markets. We therefore conclude our empirical analysis by looking at the 
time pattern of risk-taking behaviour of Indian banks during our study period. We do this by 
comparing the TFP growth index derived from the estimation of Model I, with that of a model 
that does not control for the quality of loans (Model II), as specified in Table 3.   
In particular, since the time pattern of the differences in TFP growth between the two models 
mainly signals the fluctuations across years, we also calculate and compare the cumulative 
TFP growth index using equation (4). In this way we aim to capture the cumulative effect 
over the entire sample period.   
Since Model II does not control for the quality of loans, we expect its cumulative TFP growth 
index to be greater than that of Model I. Furthermore, if the risk-taking of banks increases, the 
difference in the cumulative TFP index between the two models should also increase. The 
results of this comparison are reported in Table 8.   
Table 8 shows that Model II has a higher average as well as cumulative TFP growth rate and 
the gap between the two models tends to increase over time. 
These results imply that the growth of total loans is accompanied by the emergence of new 
non-performing loans (NPLs). This is further confirmed by Table 1, which shows that NPLs 











Table 8: Comparison of TFP Index between Model I and Model II 
 
Total Banks 
Malmquist TFP Growth Index  The Cumulative TFP Growth Index 
   
   
Model I  Model II  Difference 
(Model 
II-Model I) 
Model I  Model II  Difference 
(Model 
II-Model I) 
1993    0.985    0.970    -0.015 0.985  0.97  -0.015 
1994    1.209    1.140    -0.069 1.191  1.106  -0.085 
1995    0.991    1.067    0.076 1.18  1.18  0 
1996    0.865    0.885    0.02 1.021  1.044 0.023 
1997    0.991    1.022    0.031 1.012  1.067  0.056 
1998    1.033    1.038    0.005 1.045  1.108  0.063 
1999    0.986    1.008    0.22 1.03  1.117 0.086 
2000    1.086    1.062    -0.024 1.119  1.186  0.067 
2001    1.044    1.054    0.01 1.168  1.25  0.082 
2002    1.181    1.244    0.063 1.38  1.555  0.175 
2003    1.078    1.079    0.001 1.487  1.678  0.19 
2004    1.220    1.171    -0.049 1.815  1.965  0.15 
Geometric 
mean of annual 
TFP growth 
(1993-2004) 
1.051 1.058  0.007  ----  ----  ---- 
Note: The cumulative TFP growth index is calculated using equation (4). 
 
This result is far from satisfactory when considering the recapitalisation programme 
implemented by the Indian government to cope with the NPAs legacy of public sector banks 
and the series of prudential norms laid out at the onset of deregulation. A reduction in the 
stock of NPAs reflects banks’ capacity to recover it, as well as their risk management skills to 
control the emergence of new NPAs. Nevertheless, the fundamental way to deal with this 
problem lies in proper credit assessment and risk management mechanisms, rather than in the 
heavy cost of provisioning or writing off using financial capital. The statistics provided by 
Table 1 indicate a growing risk-aversion on the part of banks. However, our results suggest 
that a conservative risk attitude does not necessarily translate into the improvement of the 
soundness of the balance sheet. Banking is essentially an exercise of risk management. The 
deregulated operating environment provides market participants with more development 
 30opportunities as well as increased risk exposure. Our results suggest an urgent need for 
professional risk management under the new operational environment.   
 
7. Conclusions 
In this study we examined the effect of deregulation on the performance of the Indian banking 
industry and on the performance of different ownership structures within it. The time period is 
the thirteen years span from 1992 to 2004, which covers both the first and the second stage of 
deregulation (respectively 1992-1997, and 1998 onwards). We also analysed the risk-taking 
behaviour during the deregulation period, and in our main analysis we used performing loans 
rather than total loans as an output to control for risk-taking in the specification.   
The methodology employed is the estimation of non-parametric DEA efficiency frontiers and 
of Malmquist indices of TFP change. The latter are further broken down into their 
components of technological change, technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change.   
The DEA results show that the average overall technical efficiency score for the entire 
industry over our study period is 78%. Foreign banks have a significantly higher average 
efficiency in the first stage of deregulation, but public banks are ranked the best in the second 
stage. The reshuffle of ranking between public and foreign banks can be explained as the 
result of increased competition. As far as the major sources of overall technical inefficiency 
are concerned, pure technical inefficiency is the determinant for the industry as well as for the 
three ownerships. The Malmquist TFP index results show an improvement in productivity 
mainly driven by technological progress, while the relatively flat efficiency change indicates 
that banks on average kept up with the progressively higher production frontier.   
The analysis of the deregulation effect on individual ownerships suggests a similar 
technology-driven TFP growth, supporting the hypothesis that a diversity of market 
participants playing on a level field could act as a stimulant to innovation in response to 
 31greater competition (Sturm and Williams, 2004). The identification of technological 
innovators further reveals the important role of foreign ownership in the introduction of new 
technology.  
Summarising the entire body of evidence presented in this paper, there appears to be a 
several-year period for market participants to adapt to the new operational environment and 
embark on a technology-oriented approach to develop. The presence of an adjustment period 
has been observed by Humphrey and Pulley (1997) in an investigation of banks’ response to 
interest rate deregulation in the 1980s. They found that it took large US banks four years to 
minimise the deregulation-induced rise in funding costs. In our case, it seems to take the 
Indian banking system six years to finish reacting to the changes in regulatory policy and 
settle down into sustainable growth and innovation. The different adjustment experience 
between the Indian case and US practice may be attributed to the industry conditions prior to 
deregulation as well as to the gradual deregulation approach followed by the Indian authority.   
The analysis of risk-taking behaviour under deregulation seems to imply that the 
improvement in TFP went hand in hand with a deterioration of the risk position of banks’ 
balance sheets. Taking into account the increased risk-aversion of banks in the last thirteen 
years, our results suggest that a conservative risk attitude does not necessarily translate into 
the enhancement of the soundness of banks’ balance sheet if carried out without the support of 
high quality risk management skills, given the increasing complexity and sophistication of 
financial products and the increased risk exposure fostered by the deregulated operational 
environment. The policy implication that our results seem to highlight is the need to put 
professional risk management into the agenda. It should also be noted that the emergence of 
high non-performing loans is not only due to poor credit decisions by the bank management; 
the imposition of priority sector lending targets and the difficult recovery environment for bad 
loans are also important determinants. The removal of priority sector lending on one hand and 
 32strengthening of the institutional structure on the other would considerably help the safety and 
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1 The dominate role of government ownership remains even now. At the end of March, 2005, public sector 
bank holds 77.43% deposits and 71.9% total assets of the schedule commercial banking sector. Here, 
schedule commercial banks are referred to those banks that have paid up capital and reserve of no less than 
Rs. 500,000 and other conditions specified by the Banking Regulation Act of 1965. Scheduled commercial 
banks consist of public domestic private, foreign and regional rural banks.     
2 The major policy measures include the relaxation of administrative interest rate, opening up the banking 
market to domestic private and foreign participant, the reduction of statutory pre-emption and creating the 
level playing field among ownerships.   
3 The policy measures are characterized by updating prudential norms to international standard with 
country-specific adaptations.   
4 Sayuri and Shirai (2002) give a comprehensive review of Indian commercial banking.   
5 The ratio of interest received on advances to advances. 
6 The ratio of interest paid on deposits to deposits. 
7 The nationalization period refers to time span since 1969 up to 1991. The Indian government nationalized 
14 and 6 larger private banks in 1969 and 1980 respectively and imposed quantitative requirements about 
expanding network in rural areas and extending credit to priority sectors on them thereafter. 
8 Berger and Humprey (1997) give a comprehensive review about the two methodologies. 
9 In our estimations, we set TFP1992 at unity. 
10 A study by Smith (1997) showed that even though the number of observations exceeded by 13 times the 
number variables, the model still overestimated the true efficiency by 27.1%. 
11 A super-efficient unit is defined as one with a technical efficiency score larger than 1 when compared 
against a linear combination of all the other units under observation apart from itself (Andersen and 
Pertersen, 1993). 
12 All yearly observations refer to the end of March of each year, which is the financial reporting date.   
13 Pairwise t-statistic is 5.818, and Wilcoxon signed rank test statistics is -2.00, both are significant at 5%. 
14 Following Mukherjee et al. (2001), we define as technological innovators those units whose observed 
input-output combinations at time t+1 are laying outside the frontier of time t and on the frontier of time 
t+1. 
15 Voluntary Retirement Scheme is part of the manpower planning exercise aiming to trim the bloated work 
force due to the opening of branches in rural and semi-urban areas during the nationalisation period. The 
policy was announced in September, 2000 and was in operation till end of March, 2001. 
16 This has been calculated as a geometric mean. Given the relatively long sample period and a change in 
the definition of NPLs during the sample period, the geometric mean mitigates the impact of possible 
extreme data on the average result. Moreover, it is consistent with the Malmquist index mean, which is too 
a geometric average. 
17 The geometric mean of the annual growth rate of NPLs in 1992-2004 is 14.5%, while total loans is 
13.9%. Due to a change in the definition of NPLs from March 1995 (from three quarters of non-receipt of 
interest to two quarters) we also calculated the geometric mean of the annual growth rate for 1996-2004, 
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